A Stitch in Haste

Peter "Apes are People Too" Singer exposes, perhaps inadvertently, the sheer stupidity of utilitarianism:

[T]he law of diminishing marginal utility pulls utilitarians towards a more egalitarian outcome. To Joe Rich, the loss of $1000 will have no perceptible welfare impact. To Jane Poor, the gain of $1000 will make a significant difference. Other things being equal, therefore, we should redistribute from the rich to the poor until the marginal welfare loss to the rich equals the marginal welfare gain to the poor.

That is about as wrong as is humanly (primately?) possible.

The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility ("LDMU") says nothing, absolutely nothing, about interpersonal utility comparisons. This is mainly because interpersonal utility comparisons are both metaphysically and epistemologically impossible.

Let's say you and I both enjoy Snickers bars. Although economists like to talk in terms of the "utility" that you and I each derive from consuming a Snickers bar, there is no way, none whatsoever, to compare your utility to mine -- to declare mathematically or even abstractly "who enjoys Snickers bars more." It is a meaningless exercise. We can ascertain whether you prefer a Snickers bar to a Milky Way bar, or to an oatmeal cookie. But there is no way to quantify my enjoyment -- my utility -- relative to yours.

The LDMU only applies to individuals, not across individuals. It only says that, for example, I enjoy the tenth Snickers less than the ninth, which I enjoy less than the eighth, and so on.

If you and I have ten Snickers bars between us, the LDMU does NOT say that our total utility would always be highest if we split the Snickers bars 5-5 rather than 7-3 or 8-2. Maybe I'm hungrier, or maybe you're on a diet. Even though the LDMU applies to me when I eat the seventh Snickers bar relative to the sixth, it does not say that the loss to me of a seventh Snickers bar must be exceeded by the gain to you of a fourth Snickers bar. The very concept of "my marginal utility of a Snickers bar exceeding yours" is, again, meaningless.

Now, go back and re-read this post, but replace every reference to "Snickers bar" with "dollar."

So much for redistributionism increasing "social welfare."

Need a more concrete example? Go back to Singer's hypothetical of "Joe Rich" and "Jane Poor." Is it truly the case that Joe automatically values an extra $1,000 less than Jane does simply because Joe already has more dollars?

Perhaps Joe is thinking about buying a luxurious mansion that costs $10,000,000. Jane has a more modest goal -- a $100,000 fixer-upper. Joe has $9,999,000; Jane has $100,001. Joe is certainly richer than Jane, by orders of magnitude. But would he, by definition, automatically value an extra $1,000 less than Jane?

Of course not. Because -- repeat after me -- the Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility does not apply across individuals. And why is that? Because -- repeat after me -- interpersonal utility comparisons are metaphysically and epistemologically impossible.

Oh, and if interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, then what does that say about "interspecies utility comparisons"? We should be humane to animals because it is in our rational self-interest to do so and because animal cruelty imposes negative externalities on humans, not because animals have any supposed "rights."

Libertarian economics -- guaranteed to satisfy.

More from professional crackpot Peter Singer:

Why should we assume that sellers have the right to get as much as the market will bear? Two families acquire similar looking acreages of Texas grazing lands. One is fortunate: their land has oil beneath the surface and they become fabulously wealthy. The other is unfortunate: their land has no oil, and despite working as hard as their neighbors, and applying similar intelligence, they remain poor. What gives the former "a right" to their wealth? We believe in an inherent right to property because we believe that somehow rugged individuals living in a state of nature can acquire and retain wealth. That is nonsense, of course.

So I suppose Bill Gates was "fortunate" enough to acquire a random plot of land with Windows underneath it, or Pfizer was "fortunate" enough to acquire a random plot of land with Lipitor underneath it?

The first rule of haters of capitalism is to blank out the role of the capitalist -- to deny the existence of entrepreneurship and risk taking as a factor of production and just pretend that the whole world is one giant lottery.

More:

"Would interfering with market mechanisms make people, on the whole and in the long run, better off?" That's an empirical question, and the answer will obviously depend on the precise nature of the interference, and the context in which it occurs.

And whom, I wonder, would Singer propose try to answer this (impossible to answer) "empirical question"?

I'm going to start calling it Kip's Law: Every advocate of central planning always -- always -- envisions himself as the central planner.

"He is the man who became a symbol of the idea that need, not achievement, is the source of rights, that we don't have to produce, only to want, that the earned does not belong to us, but the unearned does. He became a justification for every mediocrity who, unable to make his own living, has demanded the power to dispose of the property of his betters, by proclaiming his willingness to devote his life to his inferiors at the price of robbing his superiors. ... Until men learn that of all human symbols, Robin Hood is the most immoral and the most contemptible, there will be no justice on earth and no way for mankind to survive."
--Atlas Shrugged

Dilbert creator Scott Adams, usually an extremely insightful blogger, is a bit off his game today:

Let's say you're the butler to a billionaire who lives alone. The billionaire dies in his sleep. You know he owns a large piece of jewelry that no one else has seen, and you have access to it.

If you steal the piece of jewelry, sell it, and give the money to an African charity, you can feed an entire village for a year. The village would otherwise starve. If you don't steal the jewelry, it will go to his surviving family who has so much money they won't care about it.

Obviously it is illegal to steal the jewelry and feed the starving village in Africa. But do you have a moral obligation to commit the crime for the greater good?

And if so, do you likewise have a moral obligation to steal anything else you can get your hands, from dead billionaires or living neighbors, if you can use the stolen property for the greater good?

Here is the response I posted:

I refuse to believe that you are only now discovering the non-viability of utilitarianism.

Let's say the butler tells his friend of his plan. The friend agrees in principle, but believes that curing cancer is "more better good" than fighting poverty in Africa. Is he permitted to steal the jewelry from the butler?

More importantly, should we put it up to a popular vote?

This is only difficult to people who want to justify theft. No one else.

Discuss.