ITEM: It sounds so simple — if people are drinking too much then just raise the price of alcohol.
Local councils should be allowed to set minimum prices for alcoholic drinks in a bid to cut anti-social behaviour, say MPs.
The home affairs select committee wants to end the promotion of cheap drinks as it encourages binge-drinking, said to cost the UK about £20bn a year.
However, pub industry groups believe that setting minimum drink prices would be illegal.
MY TAKE: Of course, if the “problem” is certain people drinking too much rather than too much total alcohol consumption, then the “solution” (from the perspective of the central planner) is not a price floor but a quota system. Venues could be forced to swtich from “two-drink minimums” to “four-drink maximums.” A price floor merely creates a surplus of the good in question — pubs want to supply more and patrons want to purchase less.
Even if you assume highly inelastic supply of alcohol (i.e., pubs will sell roughly the same quantity regardless of price), then the price floor is merely a tax on the drinker, including the non-binge-drinker who is not the target of the law anyway! The price increase goes either to the pub owner or the government, depending on the rule’s structure. It doesn’t really matter which — all that matters is that an extraneous third-party pays it.
And speaking of elasticity, what about the elasticity of demand for the binge drinkers who are the target of the proposal? One reason alcohol taxes are so popular is because drinkers will drink regardless of the price of alcohol. So how exactly would a price floor curb consumption, especially by binge drinkers?
Of course, it wouldn’t, but that never stops the Politics of the Warm Fuzzy Feeling. The politicians “did something.” Whether the “something” works or not is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
(SIDEBAR: Maybe the binge drinkers should all move to Green Bay, Wisconsin.)
ITEM: Maryland legislators know what’s best for Wal-Mart employees better than Wal-Mart, or the employees, do —
Maryland lawmakers yesterday approved legislation that would effectively require Wal-Mart to boost spending on health care, a direct legislative thrust against a corporate giant that is already on the defensive on many fronts nationwide.
...
Lawmakers said they did not set out to single out Wal-Mart when they drafted a bill requiring organizations with more than 10,000 employees to spend at least 8 percent of their payroll on health benefits — or put the money directly into the state's health program for the poor.
But as debate raged in the Senate yesterday, it was clear that the giant retailer, which has 15,000 workers in Maryland, was the only company that would be affected.
MY TAKE: Put aside the disgraceful, and possibly unconstitutional, singling out of a single employer to micro-manage (does the 10,000-worker limit satisfy rational basis review?). Let’s focus on the economics of the proposal.
Obviously employee compensation is more complicated that just a firm paying a worker X dollars per hour or Y dollars per year (e.g., benefits, taxes, pension accounting, etc.). But we’ll keep the numbers simple. Assume Wal-Mart is willing to pay its workers $10.00 per hour, either in cash or as a compensation bundle. Now along comes the Maryland legislature and the Politics of the Warm Fuzzy Feeling. They enact their "8% Law" — what is Wal-Mart going to do? Simple — reduce wages by the $0.80 mandate, pay $9.20 in cash and $0.80 in health care benefits. The worker is no better off because no extra compensation is going to her.
(If you think in terms of a compensation bundle, then it’s even easier: the law merely shuffles around the various components of the bundle, while the total $10.00 per hour value remains unchanged.)
So there is no benefit to the employees from such a law, but there is a cost, in the form of reduced choices and reduced utility. Again assume that Wal-Mart was paying $10.00 per hour cash with no benefits whatsoever. The Maryland law is passed and Wal-Mart complies by paying employees not $10.00 in cash, but $9.20 in cash and $0.80 in a “health voucher” redeemable at any health care provider (this framework may sound simplistic but it’s exactly what happens even if Wal-Mart diverts to $0.80 to health insurance coverage or any other non-monetary benefit). But what if a Wal-Mart employee doesn’t want or need a health-care voucher? Perhaps he’s healthy, or covered by a family member’s insurance plan, or whatever. He is clearly worse off by having a portion of his cash wage diverted into a benefit that he does not want.
The greater the number of employees like this, and the greater the extent of the “non-desire” of the non-cash benefit, the worse off the labor force is.
But again, the politicians can rest easy – they did something, and the Politics of the Warm Fuzzy Feeling triumphs once more.
Hat tip to Arnold Kling for the Wal-Mart story.
UPDATE: Cafe Hayek has more.
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