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A Stitch in Haste

A Stitch in Time Saves Nine...But Haste Makes Waste

A collection of real-world libertarian, individualist and laissez-faire rants on law, economics, politics, culture and other current events
by an average, everyday lawyer & investment banker and part-time pop scholar.

Amtrak to Embrace Dubious Random Bag Searches
(Why aren't you reading this at the new website?)

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To review: New York City's random bag search program at subway entrances is unconstitutional because any search regime that is objectively worthless cannot possibly be deemed "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment by any rational judge (irrational judges are another question altogether).

Armed with that:
Amtrak passengers will have to submit to random screening of carry-on bags in a major new security push that will include officers with automatic weapons and bomb-sniffing dogs patrolling platforms and trains, the railroad planned to announce today.
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The new procedures draw heavily on measures being used in the New York City subways, Rooney said. That model has been upheld in court challenges[.]
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People who are selected for screening and refuse will not be allowed to board, and their tickets will be refunded.

In addition to the screening, counterterrorism officers with bomb-sniffing dogs will patrol platforms and walk through trains, and sometimes they will ride the trains, officials said.
Some hasty stitches:

--Is the difference between blowing up a train and blowing up a train station equivalent to the difference between blowing up plane and blowing up an airport terminal? It's hard to think like a terrorist, but wouldn't blowing yourself up at Penn Station during the morning commute be more effective than blowing yourself up in the bar car on the Metroliner? This security theater does nothing to prevent attacks on crowded commuter terminals themselves, which are the true targets (at least in New York City).

--The very characteristic that makes the New York City subway search so mind-bogglingly stupid is the fact that would-be riders, who are anonymous, can decline to be searched, walk a block to the next entrance (or a few blocks to the next station), board there — and, if a terrorist, do their dastardly deeds anyway. Objectively demonstrable zero deterrence effect. For Amtrak, meanwhile, this wouldn't apply (since people must buy personal tickets as with air travel). So why in this instance also let them "just walk away" as we do on the subways? Why not record their data from the refunded ticket and possibly investigate them further? (I'm arguing here as a devil's advocate, not a libertarian. If you're going to have a dubious warrantless search regime, then at least try to use it intelligently.)

--Deploying sniff dogs on a train itself (rather than on platforms or in baggage areas) comes perilously close to constituting suspicionless dog sniffs of a person's body, an uniquely intrusive form of search that has never been endorsed by any court, and certainly not by the Supreme Court.

--From the article: "Amtrak has received a number of federal grants aimed at boosting security, but officials said there was no specific mandate to implement the changes." That would be on top of Amtrak's $1 billion annual subsidy from taxpayers (i.e., people who don't use Amtrak).

Remember always: The government's approach is that it is better to feel safe than to be safe — or free.

All aboard?

More thoughts at Concurring Opinions.
Posted by Kip on 19 February 2008


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