Communism + Theocracy = ?
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Q: What's the only thing worse than taxing some people so that other people can fix up their private property "for the common good"?
A: Taxing some people so that other people can fix up their churches "for the common good."
And a federal judge, somehow, sees no First Amendment violation. (With two puny exceptions: No taxpayer money for stained-glass windows or large signs.)
What's worse, the judge openly acknowledges in his decision that not one but two Supreme Court precedents are directly on point and clearly demand that the funding be blocked:
No taxpayer money to maintain or renovate churches. No taxpayer money for non-religious structures that could reasonably be foreseen to be used as churches in the future. Schools, maybe; hospitals, maybe. But not churches. Not directly, not indirectly. No taxpayer money for churches, ever. How is this unclear?
The judge instead insolently ignores these unignorable precedents and falls back on every theocrat's favorite Establishment Clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and another case, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). As in another Establishment Clause travesty I recently blogged about, the judge simply assumes, indefensibly, that taxpayer money to build churches is "not an excessive entanglement" because non-churches are also getting taxpayer money (splendid). So -- presto! -- case closed.
This despite the fact that Tilton was handed down concurrently with Lemon (i.e., the latter did not overturn the former) and that Nyquist came after Lemon and clearly refines if not limits the Lemon test and must therefore be considered the controlling precedent.
(Mitchell v. Helms, meanwhile, concerned providing educational funds to religious schools and not taxpayer money to build churches, and is therefore wholly inapplicable to this case. Furthermore, there was no majority in Mitchell, but two mutually inconsistent opinions, one of which -- O'Connor's concurrence -- expressly rejects the framework adopted by the judge in this case, and the other -- Thomas' plurality -- cites, not unfavorably, to Nyquist anyway. Clearly this was not the correct case for this judge to elevate over Nyquist, which is unequivocally on point and far more relevant than Mitchell.)
But even using Lemon to resolve this fact pattern -- despite the fact that Nyquist is controlling -- the question remains: If taxpayer money being used to build churches is not a per se "excessive entanglement" for First Amendment purposes, then what exactly ever could be "excessive"? The Establishment Clause essentially becomes a nullity. (Compare: If "public use" suddenly means anything the government wants it to mean, then that part of the Fifth Amendment's protection against eminent domain abuse becomes a nullity -- precisely as happened in Kelo v. New London.)
If Lemon, Mitchell or any other case can be read to allow taxpayer money being used to build churches, then those cases are simply wrong. They are worse than wrong -- they are abominations.
The plaintiffs are, quite rightly, considering an appeal.
Finally, let the record reflect that if government did not engage in confiscating the income and wealth of some private people solely to give it to other private people, "for the community," then questions such as these would not arise. Go figure.
The case is American Atheists v. Detroit, No. 06-11696 (E.D. Mich., August 8, 2007) (PDF - 46 pages).
A: Taxing some people so that other people can fix up their churches "for the common good."
[The case] involved a challenge to a Facade Improvement Plan (FIP) designed to enhance the appearance of a portion of the city of Detroit in anticipation of the 2005 Major League Baseball All-Star Game and the 2006 NFL SuperBowl. Under the program, approved applicants could receive up to 50% of the cost of improvements to building facades and parking lots-- with specified upper limits on reimbursements. Among the projects funded were nine by churches.Taxpayer money is being used to build churches. Not faith-based initiatives. Not hospitals, schools or summer camps. Taxpayer money is being used to build churches.
And a federal judge, somehow, sees no First Amendment violation. (With two puny exceptions: No taxpayer money for stained-glass windows or large signs.)
What's worse, the judge openly acknowledges in his decision that not one but two Supreme Court precedents are directly on point and clearly demand that the funding be blocked:
If, at the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advancing religion. To this extent the Act therefore trespasses on the Religion Clauses.--Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
If the State may not erect buildings in which religious activities are to take place, it may not maintain such buildings or renovate them when they fall into disrepair.--Comm. For Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
No taxpayer money to maintain or renovate churches. No taxpayer money for non-religious structures that could reasonably be foreseen to be used as churches in the future. Schools, maybe; hospitals, maybe. But not churches. Not directly, not indirectly. No taxpayer money for churches, ever. How is this unclear?
The judge instead insolently ignores these unignorable precedents and falls back on every theocrat's favorite Establishment Clause case, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and another case, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). As in another Establishment Clause travesty I recently blogged about, the judge simply assumes, indefensibly, that taxpayer money to build churches is "not an excessive entanglement" because non-churches are also getting taxpayer money (splendid). So -- presto! -- case closed.
This despite the fact that Tilton was handed down concurrently with Lemon (i.e., the latter did not overturn the former) and that Nyquist came after Lemon and clearly refines if not limits the Lemon test and must therefore be considered the controlling precedent.
(Mitchell v. Helms, meanwhile, concerned providing educational funds to religious schools and not taxpayer money to build churches, and is therefore wholly inapplicable to this case. Furthermore, there was no majority in Mitchell, but two mutually inconsistent opinions, one of which -- O'Connor's concurrence -- expressly rejects the framework adopted by the judge in this case, and the other -- Thomas' plurality -- cites, not unfavorably, to Nyquist anyway. Clearly this was not the correct case for this judge to elevate over Nyquist, which is unequivocally on point and far more relevant than Mitchell.)
But even using Lemon to resolve this fact pattern -- despite the fact that Nyquist is controlling -- the question remains: If taxpayer money being used to build churches is not a per se "excessive entanglement" for First Amendment purposes, then what exactly ever could be "excessive"? The Establishment Clause essentially becomes a nullity. (Compare: If "public use" suddenly means anything the government wants it to mean, then that part of the Fifth Amendment's protection against eminent domain abuse becomes a nullity -- precisely as happened in Kelo v. New London.)
If Lemon, Mitchell or any other case can be read to allow taxpayer money being used to build churches, then those cases are simply wrong. They are worse than wrong -- they are abominations.
The plaintiffs are, quite rightly, considering an appeal.
Finally, let the record reflect that if government did not engage in confiscating the income and wealth of some private people solely to give it to other private people, "for the community," then questions such as these would not arise. Go figure.
The case is American Atheists v. Detroit, No. 06-11696 (E.D. Mich., August 8, 2007) (PDF - 46 pages).
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Posted by Kip on
9 August 2007
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