Two Supreme Court Non-Cases
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Two denials* of certiorari by the Supreme Court caught my eye today. (*Actually one denial and one "dismissal as improvidently granted.")
The first, Maryland v. Blake (04-373), concerned whether a suspect, after having been arrested and read his "Miranda warning," can "undo" his request to speak with a lawyer before the police can resume questioning him. Current federal constitutional jurisprudence generally says "yes" if the waiver is "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" — see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). (Although in Blake there was the added element of some fairly blatant police misconduct, which may have explained why the case got to the Supreme Court in the first place.)
The Supreme Court had originally agreed to hear the case, but they changed their minds yesterday and dismissed the previous grant of certiorari. They did not decide the case on the merits, and federal "right to counsel" law is unaffected.
The fact pattern interests me because, even though federal constitutional jurisprudence says an arrestee may change his mind about "lawyering up," New York State constitutional jurisprudence says otherwise. In New York, if you say "I want a lawyer," then all interaction with the arrestee must cease until a lawyer is present. In New York you literally cannot waive your right to a lawyer unless it is in the presence of your lawyer — an interpretation of the right to counsel that is far more comprehensive than federal guarantees.
This is the kind of federalism I like: the U.S. Constitution, as construed and interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, grants a floor on individual rights, a bare minimum that applies throughout the country. But then each state can decide to afford even more rights above and beyond what the federal Constitution requires.
That's a far cry from how most people define "federalism" — namely whether individual rights will be trampled by the federal government or the states (or both).
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The Supreme Court also denied cert in a felon disenfranchisement case, Johnson v. Bush (05-212). I've blogged in defense of felon disenfranchisement previously. To review: the power of states to deny convicted felons the ability to vote is clearly granted by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unequivocal constitutional provision has not, however, stopped some voting rights activists to assert that since, in some jurisdictions, the convicted felon population includes a disproportionate number of minorities, felon disenfranchisement therefore constitutes racial discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Hogwash. The best way to avoid felon disenfranchisement is by avoiding becoming a felon in the first place. Furthermore, such permanent forfeitures are entirely fair and proper. A lifetime loss of privileges (e.g., disbarment of attorneys who commit misconduct) is a perfectly legitimate retributive tool of justice.
With Johnson v. Bush there was simply no "there" there and the Supreme Court was entirely correct to decline to hear the case.
Hat tip to SCOTUSblog.
The first, Maryland v. Blake (04-373), concerned whether a suspect, after having been arrested and read his "Miranda warning," can "undo" his request to speak with a lawyer before the police can resume questioning him. Current federal constitutional jurisprudence generally says "yes" if the waiver is "knowing, intelligent and voluntary" — see Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). (Although in Blake there was the added element of some fairly blatant police misconduct, which may have explained why the case got to the Supreme Court in the first place.)
The Supreme Court had originally agreed to hear the case, but they changed their minds yesterday and dismissed the previous grant of certiorari. They did not decide the case on the merits, and federal "right to counsel" law is unaffected.
The fact pattern interests me because, even though federal constitutional jurisprudence says an arrestee may change his mind about "lawyering up," New York State constitutional jurisprudence says otherwise. In New York, if you say "I want a lawyer," then all interaction with the arrestee must cease until a lawyer is present. In New York you literally cannot waive your right to a lawyer unless it is in the presence of your lawyer — an interpretation of the right to counsel that is far more comprehensive than federal guarantees.
This is the kind of federalism I like: the U.S. Constitution, as construed and interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, grants a floor on individual rights, a bare minimum that applies throughout the country. But then each state can decide to afford even more rights above and beyond what the federal Constitution requires.
That's a far cry from how most people define "federalism" — namely whether individual rights will be trampled by the federal government or the states (or both).
---
The Supreme Court also denied cert in a felon disenfranchisement case, Johnson v. Bush (05-212). I've blogged in defense of felon disenfranchisement previously. To review: the power of states to deny convicted felons the ability to vote is clearly granted by Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This unequivocal constitutional provision has not, however, stopped some voting rights activists to assert that since, in some jurisdictions, the convicted felon population includes a disproportionate number of minorities, felon disenfranchisement therefore constitutes racial discrimination in violation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
Hogwash. The best way to avoid felon disenfranchisement is by avoiding becoming a felon in the first place. Furthermore, such permanent forfeitures are entirely fair and proper. A lifetime loss of privileges (e.g., disbarment of attorneys who commit misconduct) is a perfectly legitimate retributive tool of justice.
With Johnson v. Bush there was simply no "there" there and the Supreme Court was entirely correct to decline to hear the case.
Hat tip to SCOTUSblog.
Posted by Kip on
14 November 2005
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